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e can differentiate between three perspectives on moral issues: 
the first is prescriptive, the second descriptive and the third 
ascriptive. In prescriptive perspective, morality is a matter of how 
human beings ought to act. It is normative, which means that it defines 
what is to be condemned and what to condone. Using a descriptive 
perspective, anthropologists and historians record what moral views 
people currently hold and what views they held in the past. The 
descriptive perspective is inherently comparative. The ascriptive 
perspective was once concerned with whether or not an individual was 
of virtuous nature. Nowadays, moral psychology, the neuroscience of 
morality and evolutionary biology try to map, and hence ascribe, the 
organic and evolutionary origins of moral intuitions. The ascriptive 
perspective, then, could be considered materialist. 
The three perspectives focus on different aspects of morality: the 
prescriptive perspective on norms, the descriptive perspective on 
practices and the ascriptive perspective on biological causes. In 
common usage, the perspectives are rarely kept apart. Confucius, for 
example, prescribes the supreme virtue of filial piety by describing 
how people behave, hence using a descriptive perspective to fashion a 
prescriptive one. The relevant passage in the Analects (13.18) reads as 
follows: ‘The Lord of Yè instructed Confucius, saying, ‘There is an 
upright man in my district. His father stole a sheep, and he testified 
against him’. Confucius said, ‘The upright men in my district are 
different. Fathers cover up for their sons and sons cover up for their 
fathers. Uprightness lies therein’.’ By describing how the men of his 
district behave, Confucius wants to educate the Lord of Yè on how 
people should behave. 
We all know that moral admonitions often are couched in the 
language of actual behaviour, as when people say, ‘because this is how 
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we do it’ or ‘this is what we have always done’. Given this insight, it is 
surprising that the habit of mistaking description for prescription, and 
vice versa, could give rise to concepts and theories of integrated, 
homogeneous sociocultural systems and moral communities in 
anthropology. For decades, anthropologists confused normative 
statements about morality with native descriptions of actual social 
practices. Jomo Kenyatta’s thesis can serve as an example. 
 
The illusion of moral communities 
 
Kenyatta, personal student of Bronisław Malinowski and future prime 
minister of Kenya, wrote his thesis in the 1930s. The thesis, 
subsequently published as Facing Mount Kenya: the tribal life of the 
Gikuyu (London: Secker and Warburg, 1938), was filled with moral 
tales of ‘tribal customs’, the most notorious of which was the custom of 
cutting off the visible part of the clitoris; a practice known as 
clitoridectomy. What did Kenyatta mean when he referred to this 
practice as custom? That ‘custom is lord of all’ (‘νόµος ὁ πάντων 
βασιλεύς’), as the ancient Greek poet Pindar (fragment 169a) put it? 
But if custom indeed were the lord of all, morality would serve no 
purpose. Moral norms are needed because custom is not lord of all. 
When Kenyatta made a case for the moral benefits and key function in 
Kikuyu society and culture of clitoridectomy, he defended the custom 
against attacks not just from ‘a number of influential European 
agencies—missionary, sentimental pro-African, government, 
educational and medical authorities’ (Kenyatta 1938: 125), who 
demanded the immediate suspension of the practice, but also from 
fellow Kikuyu who, according to Kenyatta, were detribalised because 
they had been ‘away from home for some years’ and now thought fit 
‘to denounce the custom and to marry uncircumcised girls, especially 
from coastal tribes’ (ibid: 127). These were bold words coming from a 
man who had himself been accused of detribalisation because of his 
Western education, his many years in Europe, his amorous affairs with 
European women, his Leninist publications etc. 
But resistance to clitoridectomy did not just come from European 
agencies like the Church of Scotland Mission and from Kikuyu critics; 
it also came from girls about to be cut. Kenyatta tried his best to mask 
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this fact. He wrote that the girl, who sits with her legs wide open 
while she is being cut, ‘is not supposed to show any fear or make any 
audible sign of emotion or even to blink.’ (ibid: 140). The keywords 
here are ‘supposed to’: the difference between morality and practice 
lies in these words. Moral norms exist because people don’t follow them. If 
everyone always were to act in accordance with a moral norm, it 
would be neither moral nor norm; it would simply be human 
behaviour. The defining feature of moral norms is their violation. 
Kenyatta narrates that girls who do not comply with the moral 
norm of suffering quietly during clitoridectomy are punished. To 
blink, wince or whimper ‘would be considered cowardice (kerogi)’ and 
make the girl ‘the butt of ridicule among her companions’ (ibid). If the 
natural reaction of each and every girl having her clitoris cut off were 
to remain unmoved and poised—if it were the equivalent of, say, 
squeezing a pimple—such social sanctions would be uncalled for. 
(Kenyatta added that an uncut Kikuyu girl could not get married. He 
himself married and had a child with a white British schoolteacher, 
who, one can assume, had an intact clitoris). 
Presenting moral norms as social practice served both Kenyatta’s 
political purpose of nationalism and Malinowski’s functionalist cause.2 
What unites nationalism and functionalism is their reliance on models 
of homogeneous, integrated moral communities. Paying attention to 
and describing in detail trembling bodies and suppressed moans of 
agony shatters this illusion.3 
 
Ascription and anthropology 
 
A descriptive perspective could be applied to the entire range of moral 
norms and practices. The historical and ethnographic record abounds 
with different moral norms: slaves should honour their master; wives 
should exhibit deference to their husbands; blasphemy should be 
punishable by death; same-sex couples should be allowed to marry 
each other; children should be able to explore their sexuality; etc. 
Observers of such a diversity of moral norms at times adopt the 
position of moral relativism, which extends the realisation that a 
particular view of right and wrong, good and bad, odious and virtuous 
is not shared by everyone—that, indeed, people might hold opposite 
	  Yearbook of the Centre for Cosmopolitan Studies, 2014(1) 
	  
4 
moral views on the same issue—to the conclusion that it is impossible 
to arrive at valid decisions in matters of morality. 
Today, most human beings understand that not everyone on the 
planet shares their moral views. Yet, most human beings hold moral 
convictions and often their convictions are strong. Anthropologists 
are no exception. They might subscribe to moral relativism on rational 
grounds, yet are likely to react viscerally to certain moral infractions 
like, say, repeated child abuse and wife beating—at least if it occurs 
close to home. Robert Redford once wrote: ‘It was easy to look with 
equal benevolence upon all sorts of value systems so long as the values 
were those of unimportant little people remote from our own 
concerns. But the equal benevolence is harder to maintain when one is 
asked to anthropologize the Nazis’ (Redford 1953: 145). Today we 
know that it is possible to maintain, if not benevolence, at least 
methodological neutrality when studying Nazis, génocidaires, 
paedophiles and other nasty people. To avoid coming under suspicion 
of defending atrocious behaviour, anthropologists tell themselves and 
others that their relativism is methodological, not moral. This tale 
does nothing to solve the conundrum of us having double moral 
standards: one standard which we suspend to achieve methodological 
relativism and another which remains unsuspended. In the first case 
we adopt a detached view, in the second we are driven by our moral 
intuitions. 
The disjunction between detachment and intuition makes sense in 
ascriptive perspective. Moral psychology, the neuroscience of morality 
and evolutionary biology hypothesise that human beings tend to react 
intuitively to suggestions and acts they find morally offensive. A 
preferred example in this context is that of how people react to what 
they perceive to be unfair treatment. Case studies, psychological 
experiments and the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging 
suggest that human beings with intact brains react negatively to 
unfairness.4 This research also indicates that moral judgments issue 
from unconscious processes, not from conscious decision-making and 
that explanations for why an individual made a certain moral choice 
are rationalisations after the fact.5 
In her comparative work, the anthropologist/political scientist 
Alison Dundes Renteln (2013: 71-114) suggests that a transcultural 
moral feature might be the notion of proportionality of retribution. 
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She acknowledges that what is considered to be a proportionate 
retribution varies—an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth in one 
case, financial compensation and imprisonment in another. But what 
seems to be rejected universally is arbitrary and unfair forms of 
retribution. It is not surprising, then, that humanity’s first written 
codes (that we know of) specify proportionate retributions for various 
infractions. 
Do these hypotheses of moral instincts and intuitions tell us 
something about human nature? While many, if not most, people have 
more or less vague notions about human nature—man is born in sin; 
humans are wicked by nature; human beings come into the world as 
pure souls; etc.—they are easily dismissed by anthropologists because 
they do not hold up to the standards of empirical research. Scientific 
hypotheses, which ascribe moral intuitions such as an innate fairness 
instinct to human beings and thereby point into the direction of 
human nature, are more difficult to shrug off, however. At the same 
time, such hypotheses raise at least two questions: can human history’s 
many elaborate normative systems of morality be deduced from a 
fairness instinct or some other innate faculty? And why does the 
supposed fairness instinct not inhibit unfair treatment; put differently: 
if everyone is equipped with the moral instinct for fairness, why is 
there a need for moral norms to ensure fair treatment in the first 
place? Without being able to address these questions at this point, 
they are mentioned here to caution against uncritically adopting the 
explanatory model provided by the ascriptive perspective in moral 
psychology, the neuroscience of morality and evolutionary biology. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Three perspectives on moral issues have been considered. The 
ascriptive perspective attributes a fairness instinct to human beings 
and seems to demonstrate that moral judgments are made in the 
shadows of the unconscious, not in the bright light of conscious, 
rational choice. The descriptive perspective registers moral diversity 
and lends itself to moral relativism. The prescriptive perspective 
generates norms and codes for morality and defines more or less 
clearly what constitutes their violation. In ascriptive and prescriptive 
perspective, morality tends to be viewed as a panhuman 
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phenomenon—either in terms of instincts or capacities common to all 
human beings or as norms and principles to which everyone ought to 
conform. Few anthropologists would object to the idea that human 
beings have a capacity for morality (as well as for moral 
transgressions). They might, however, disagree with the idea that 
there is such a thing as universal, unchanging moral principles. A 
properly devised comparative description of various moral norms and 
codes testifies to the fact of moral diversity. The descriptive 
perspective resembles what Thomas Nagel (1986) calls a ‘view from 
nowhere’, that is, a view which feigns a nebula’s-eye view. This refers 
to the human capacity to see ourselves ‘as arbitrary, idiosyncratic, 
highly specific occupants of the world, one of countless possible forms 
of life’ (Nagel 1971: 725). Nagel elaborates: ‘humans have the special 
capacity to step back and survey themselves, and the lives to which 
they are committed, with that detached amazement which comes from 
watching an ant struggle up a heap of sand […] the view is at once 
sobering and comical’ (ibid: 720). 
Albert Camus believed that this type of sobering and comical view 
originates in the collision between the human search for meaning and 
the silence and meaninglessness of the universe (a universe in which 
‘we find no vestige of a beginning,—no prospect of an end’, to quote 
Edinburgh’s own, James Hutton). The result of this collision, 
according to Camus, is absurdity. Nagel locates absurdity somewhere 
else: ‘when we take this view and recognise what we do as arbitrary, it 
does not disengage us from life, and there lies our absurdity: not in the 
fact that such an external view can be taken of us, but in the fact that 
we ourselves can take it, without ceasing to be the persons whose 
ultimate concerns are so coolly regarded’ (ibid). 
We can apply this definition of absurdity to our own predicament 
as anthropologists: on one hand, we can adopt a detached view of the 
moral intuitions that drive us and other people; on the other, we do 
not cease to be the persons whose morality we so coolly regard. The 
absurdity of our condition lies in the fact that we both are and are not 
moral relativists. We are moral relativists as soon as we acknowledge 
the contingency of our moral intuitions and principles. The accident of 
our birth determined the range of moral choices available to us. At the 
same time, we are moral beings and cannot help being moral. So I find 
myself siding with Nagel when he writes that ‘the human duality of 
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perspectives is too deep for us reasonably to hope to overcome it’ 
(Nagel 1986: 185). Under these circumstances, finding anthropology’s 
moral voice and vision—and here I part ways with Nagel’s view on 
morality—is not a matter of moving beyond the human duality of 
perspectives by developing a political philosophy in syllogistic steps (if 
A and B, then C). It is an uneasy, dissatisfying acknowledgement of 
our absurd dilemma and its consequences, the most important of 
which is that we simply know too much to speak with fervour and 
devotion about morality. If anything, the moral voice in anthropology 
ought to sound like a mumbling stammer. 
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1 Professor, Malmö University. 
2 See Berman 1996. 
33 Worse than Kenyatta’s functionalist tale of clitoridectomy—which, after all, was 
written in the 1930s—are contemporary advocates of female genital amputation like 
Carla Obermeyer and Richard Shweder, who use aggregate statistical data to denounce 
opponents of the practice. The individual girl who is not ‘brave’ enough to undergo 
clitoridectomy—or is left traumatised by the procedure—is likely to be statistically 
insignificant from their point of view because (a) ‘most’ girls and women are in favour 
of continuing the custom and (b) aggregate data (if interpreted by Obermeyer and 
Shweder) indicate that the effects of clitoridectomy on the health and sexuality of 
women are not as bad as anti-female-genital-mutilation activists claim. For an 
analytically sophisticated critique of Obermeyer and Shweder, see Mackie 2003. 
4 A primary instrument for measuring people’s reactions to unfair treatment is the 
Ultimatum Game: one player proposes how to divide a sum of money; the second 
player can accept or reject the offer; if she rejects the offer, neither player receives any 
money; if she accepts the offer the money is divided according to the first player’s 
proposal. Second players tend to reject offers they consider too unfair, even if this 
means that they walk away empty-handed. 
5 See, e.g., Greene 2003, Haidt 2007, Haidt and Joseph 2004, and Hauser 2006. For a 
more comprehensive review of social decision-making in neuroscientific perspective, 
see Rilling and Sanfey 2013.	  
